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Introduction 
 
 
Turkey as Partner of the EU in the 
Refugee Crisis 
Ankara’s Problems and Interests 
Günter Seufert 
Rarely has a resolution by the European Union heads of state and government been 
criticised from such diverse perspectives and positions of vested interest as the EU’s 
agreements with the Turkish government of 29th November 2015 regarding the allevia-
tion of the refugee crisis. Eastern European states, human rights organisations, a Euro-
pean public critical of Turkey and Turkish intellectuals are united in their skeptical 
rejection of Brussels’ policies. They take the view that the EU’s financial and political 
concessions to Turkey have overstepped the mark. By contrast, the situation in Turkey 
has barely played any part in the discussion to date. Little interest has been shown in 
the financial means at Turkey’s disposal in order to fulfil these tasks, in the political 
cost which would arise for the government as a result of steps taken in the above-men-
tioned direction and in the major upheaval in Turkish asylum and aliens policy which 
is inevitably associated with the agreements. Also lacking is speculation on why Turkey 
is prepared to cooperate with the European Union at all, how it could have been per-
suaded to participate in such a collaboration initially and on which mutual objectives 
and interests a cooperation of this nature could be based. 
 
“Approximately 1.5 million people entered 
the EU illegally in 2015. The majority of 
these via Turkey.” With these words, spoken 
during the meeting with Ankara, the Presi-
dent of the European Council, Donald Tusk, 
outlined not only the extent of the refugee 
crisis and the central role played in it by 
Turkey, but also the primary concern of the 
gathering. It was, and continues to be a 
matter of the regaining of control over the 
external European border in the Aegean, 
which was lost during the influx of over 
150,000 non-registered entries to Greece in 
September 2015 alone. In the interests of 
the internal peace, security and cohesion of 
the European Union, immigration must be 
controllable and the identity of entrants 
determinable. Furthermore, policy develop-
ment as regards the refugee question will 
only be possible if state bodies are not de-
prived of the opportunity to decide which 
groups of migrants are accepted. Experi-
ences with previous refugee movements 
from North Africa to Spain and Italy and 
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those from Albania to Italy have shown 
that, in the case of large-scale migrations, 
the control of maritime borders is only 
possible in cooperation with the states on 
the opposite coastline. In the case of the 
Aegean, this is Turkey. All other proposals 
pitched into the debate add nothing to the 
achievement of this first, short-term goal; 
neither the “equitable” distribution of refu-
gees across Europe, nor the increased sup-
port of initial host countries of Syrian refu-
gees such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; 
neither the fight against people smugglers 
nor the extension of the list of “safe coun-
tries of origin”. That Turkey is, notwith-
standing the frequently expressed contrary 
view, quite capable of limiting irregular 
migration from its coastlines became evi-
dent just two days after the meeting, when 
the Turkish coastguard service prevented 
the passage of approximately 1,500 individ-
uals. As a result, the critical question is not 
whether Turkey is able to control larger-
scale migration movements, but whether 
it is prepared to do so in the medium and 
long term. 
The EU’s agreements with Ankara 
The agreements of 29th November 2015 
consist of reciprocal memoranda of under-
standing, and announce the implementa-
tion of the Mutual Action Plan between 
Turkey and the EU of 15th October 2015. 
In the Action Plan, Turkey secures strict-
er controls of its maritime and land borders 
with the EU and the implementation of 
readmission agreements with Greece and 
Bulgaria. It guarantees the implementation 
of new regulations for the registration and 
classification of refugees in cooperation 
with the United Nations High Commission-
er for Refugees and announces a tightening 
of its visa policy towards the chief countries 
of origin of refugees. The fight against peo-
ple smugglers is due to be stepped up, and 
the cooperation with Frontex expanded. In 
addition, Turkey professes its intention to 
strengthen measures directed at refugees’ 
access to social and medical services, the 
education of refugee children and the “par-
ticipation” of the refugees “in the economy”. 
At the meeting of 29th November, Ankara 
promised to implement the readmission 
agreement with the EU by July 2016. 
In return, the EU expressed its willingness 
to recommend that the Schengen member 
states lift the visa requirement for Turkish 
citizens by October 2016, when the re-
admission agreement has been fulfilled 
and the Turkish visa regulations for third 
countries have been revised. Moreover, 
Brussels has secured extensive immediate 
and longer-term financial aid for the sup-
port of refugees in Turkey. Additionally, 
the EU also hinted at the acceleration of 
accession negotiations, the immediate 
opening of chapter 17 and the imminent 
opening of further negotiation chapters. 
It also committed to the instigation of bi-
annual summit meetings with Turkey, the 
establishment of a continual political dia-
logue, high-level dialogue formats on eco-
nomic and energy policy and the renegotia-
tion of the customs union. 
How realistic is it to expect that Turkey 
will actually implement its memoranda of 
understanding? 
An overview of the refugee situation in 
Turkey, the costs to and political burdens 
placed upon the country as a result of the 
refugee crisis and, also, of the prevailing 
legal situation and the political tradition 
of Turkish asylum and aliens law demon-
strates how major the steps expected by 
Europe of Turkey actually are. 
Immense financial and political 
costs for Ankara 
On the one hand, there is the high financial 
burden to Turkey caused by the refugee 
crisis. According to data published by the 
UNHCR, Turkey is hosting a constant figure 
of over two million refugees, primarily 
from Syria, but also from Iraq. It is also the 
chief initial destination of future waves of 
refugees from Syria, where between three 
and five million people are waiting for a 
chance to emigrate. However, even if Turkey 
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should close its borders, the number of 
Syrians in the country will continue to rise. 
Over 150,000 Syrian children have been 
born in Turkey since the mass exodus in 
2011. This figure will rise further; 54 per 
cent of Syrian refugees are 18 years of age 
or younger. 
Ankara has calculated that it has spent 
over eight billion dollars on the placement 
of a maximum of 15 per cent of the refugees 
in 25 camps (the remainder lives outside 
of these), on their registration, emergency 
medical treatment and on the partial edu-
cation of the children to date. 
At a rate of approximately 90 per cent, 
the education of minors is only satisfactory 
within the camps. For the large majority 
of children living outside the camps, the 
education rate is just 24 per cent, and, as 
a result, two thirds of the Syrian minors 
living in Turkey remain unschooled – this 
equates to over 400,000. It follows that the 
refugees’ integration within Turkish soci-
ety, as demanded by the EU, presents the 
country not only with major organisational 
challenges, but with immense financial ones 
as well. Yet the necessary funds are dwin-
dling rapidly. In 2015, economic growth in 
Turkey fell short of the anticipated 4.0 per 
cent and registered at a mere 2.5 per cent, 
while youth unemployment climbed from 
15.5 to 17 per cent and the overall rate of 
unemployment is predicted to rise from 9.9 
to 11.6 per cent in 2016. 
It follows that Ankara has good reasons 
for waving through refugees wishing to 
journey onwards, just as the Balkan states 
or, indeed, the EU member states Hungary, 
Croatia, Slovenia and Austria, have done. 
As a result, equitable burden-sharing is a 
prerequisite for any long-term collabora-
tion between Turkey and the EU. 
The skepticism of the native population 
poses a second challenge to the integration 
of refugees within Turkish society. Despite 
the fact that the acceptance of refugees in 
Turkey – unlike in Europe – played no role 
in the presidential election campaigns in 
2014 and the two parliamentary elections 
in 2015, public sentiment in the country is 
turning against the refugees. In 2014, 
70 per cent of local citizens considered the 
Syrians an economic burden. In the south-
east of the country, where the majority of 
refugees reside, three fifths of local resi-
dents were convinced that Syrians were 
more criminal than locals and presented 
adanger to public order in early 2015. 
70 per cent of respondents even deemed the 
refugees a security risk to the country. The 
figures demonstrate the level of resistance 
which the implementation of the EU’s ex-
pectations will encounter with regard to 
the longer-term integration of refugees with-
in Turkish society. The “participation” of 
refugees “in the economy”, whatever form 
this takes, as referred to in the EU’s Action 
Plan with Turkey, can only be achieved in 
the face of opposition from large swathes of 
the population. Officially, the government 
is continuing to assert the possibility of a 
swift return of the refugees to their coun-
tries of origin, and refrains from confront-
ing the population with the reality of the 
Syrians’ permanent presence. Long-term, 
substantial cooperation with Turkey on the 
issue of refugees is thus required – not only 
in order to gain government support, but 
also that of at least parts of the population. 
A break with the Republic’s 
ideological tradition 
Moreover, the long-term integration of refu-
gees in Turkish society presupposes a break 
with firmly established legal traditions in 
the Republic of Turkey, which reflect deep-
ly-rooted ideological paradigms. In the 
1920s and 1930s, the migration and popula-
tion policies pursued by the young republic 
were aimed at the creation of a nation as 
homogeneous as possible, which would 
speak Turkish and be of Sunni Muslim faith. 
This goal was served by the population ex-
change with Greece in 1923, which planned 
and implemented the deportation of Greek 
Orthodox Christians from Turkey and the 
admission of Sunni Muslims from Greece. 
Similar agreements were made with Roma-
nia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia until 1939. 
SWP Comments 1 
January 2016 
4 
The objective of homogenising the nation 
in line with a Turkish Muslim identity also 
served the so-called “Resettlement Law” 
(iskan kanunu) of 1934, which limited the 
settlement and granting of citizenship on 
a large scale to groups of “Turkish origin 
and culture”. The practices pursued in the 
following years showed that this wording 
was aimed not primarily at the Central 
Asian Turkic peoples, but rather at members 
of smaller Sunni Muslim nations from the 
Balkans and the Caucasus, who were pur-
portedly easier to integrate within the 
Turkish nation. The settlement of groups 
such as these was designed not only to in-
crease Turkey’s overall population, but also 
to decrease the proportion of groups diffi-
cult to assimilate, particularly the Kurds. 
Although this type of policy was wide-
spread among the region’s young nation 
states in the 1930s, the ideology remains 
influential and effective in Turkey today. 
The revised version of the Resettlement 
Law of 26th September 2006 continues to 
make the fulfilment of the above criteria 
the precondition for the settlement of 
larger groups and the granting of citizen-
ship to their members. That the corre-
sponding ideological orientation remains 
valid is demonstrated by the fact that, in 
2014, Kurdish Yazidi refugees were only 
accepted into the country in the wake of 
vehement protests against the rejection of 
their applications. 
Turkey would bid farewell to its ideal of 
a culturally homogeneous nation with the 
integration and subsequent naturalisation 
of a large number of Arabic-speaking refu-
gees. Although the Kurdish conflict has 
permanently undermined the earlier self-
evidence of the concept of a culturally 
homogeneous nation within the popula-
tion, nationalist parties and sections of the 
security apparatus are clinging to it more 
strongly than ever. The less successful Tur-
key is in extricating itself from the nation-
alist parameters of its founding years, the 
lower Europe’s chances of cooperating with 
it in overcoming the refugee crisis will be. 
Necessary remodelling of asylum 
and aliens law 
The current legal situation in Turkey is also 
opposed to the long-term integration of 
Syrian refugees within Turkish society. We 
have already referred to the “Resettlement 
Law”, which, in its current version, pre-
vents the naturalisation of larger groups of 
people of “non-Turkish origin and culture”. 
However, the next best provision for 
refugees, i.e. the granting of a right of resi-
dence as a recognised asylum seeker, is not 
possible for the main body of refugees from 
Syria under current Turkish law at the 
present time. Although Turkey ratified the 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees of 1951 and also acknowledged 
the New York Protocol of 1967 relating to 
the same, like three other of the 142 signa-
tory states of these two agreements (Congo, 
Madagascar and Monaco), Turkey takes ad-
vantage of an option granted to the signa-
tory states at the time, and practices a so-
called “geographical limitation”. It thus 
applies the convention only to refugees 
from Europe, i.e. to member states of the 
Council of Europe. As only very few individ-
uals from countries with membership of 
the Council of Europe have sought protec-
tion in Turkey, less than twenty asylum 
seekers received the legal status of a rec-
ognised refugee between 1995 and 2010 
annually. 
To date, refugees from non-European 
states have only been able to be resettled in 
a country willing to accept them in the 
wake of their recognition in coordination 
with the UNHCR. As a result, Turkey, de-
spite its strenuous efforts, has hitherto 
offered refugees no longer-term perspective. 
The third-best status one can achieve is 
a temporary legally-protected right of resi-
dence. Of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, 
only approximately 80,000 people, the 
three per cent who entered the country 
with a passport, hold an official residence 
permit. According to the “Law on Work 
Permits for Foreign Nationals”, they may 
receive a permit to perform work usually 
unpopular with native applicants. Although 
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the Turkish authorities were generous in 
their interpretation of these regulations 
when it came to Syrian applicants, only 
approximately 10,000 work permits have 
been granted to date, 6,000 of which to 
joint proprietors of companies which were 
founded with Syrian capital, among other 
assets. 
In October 2014, the over 95 per cent 
majority of all Syrian refugees in Turkey 
received a clearly-defined status for the first 
time, with the enactment of the “Tempo-
rary Protection” Regulation (TP). Although 
this group was and continues to be referred 
to as “guests” in line with government 
rhetoric, and is, in practice, tolerated with-
in the country, they were, by law, however, 
irregular migrants lacking all legal protec-
tion. The TP grants fleeing and registered 
Syrians the right to a refugee identity card 
and, with this, the guarantee of “non-
refoulement”, or non-expulsion or return, 
for the first time. The refugee identity card 
also provides access to interpreting services, 
emergency medical treatment and, as far 
as these are available, social services. State 
schools have been obliged to accept the 
children of Syrian refugees since September 
2014. 
However, the issue of work permits has 
been excluded to date. Although the afore-
mentioned decree of October 2014 stipu-
lates that the Council of Ministers should 
determine geographical regions and eco-
nomic sectors for which work permits may 
be issued, this has not yet occurred, and 
would, in all likelihood, meet with a fierce 
reaction from the population. The fact that, 
in August 2015, the Ministry for National 
Education found itself forced to immediate-
ly deny reports announcing the issue of 
work permits to Syrian teachers urgently 
required for the education of the children 
of refugees is a case in point. If Turkey 
really does wish to cooperate with Europe 
as regards the refugee issue, it must subject 
its asylum and aliens law to a fundamental 
overhaul. 
Farewell to the political 
instrumentalisation of refugees 
“The EU finally got Turkey’s message and 
opened its purse strings. What did we say? 
‘We’ll open our borders and unleash all the 
Syrian refugees on you’.” These were the 
comments of Burhan Kuzu, one of the chief 
advisers to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
on the tentative agreement between the EU 
and Turkey of 29th November in Brussels. 
Two weeks previously, Erdoğan himself had 
not only accused the Europeans of “turning 
the Mediterranean into a cemetery”, but 
also threateningly posed the question: 
“What would happen if 2.2 million refugees 
all march to Europe?” As early as 7th Sep-
tember, shortly before large numbers of 
refugees started transiting from the Turkish 
Aegean coast to the Greek islands, the 
editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Yeni 
Şafak, the semi-official party organ of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP), sent 
an initial warning to the EU. His commen-
tary was entitled: “Open the gates for mil-
lions to flock to Europe!” It included the 
words: “A great march to Europe should 
begin, from Anatolia, from the coasts of the 
Mediterranean, ... from Afghanistan and 
Syria, from Mesopotamia and North Africa, 
... to the capitals of Europe ...” Although the 
editor-in-chief has a reputation as a zealot 
with a tendency to overstep the mark, this 
is not the first time that the Turkish gov-
ernment has politically instrumentalised 
the refugee crisis. 
The generous acceptance of Syrian refu-
gees was not only carried out on humani-
tarian grounds, but also on the basis of 
political considerations. In September 2012, 
Erdoğan expressed his hope that he would 
shortly be able to perform the ritual prayer 
in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. 
Ankara was banking on the rebels’ rapid 
victory and the subsequent end of the war. 
At political level, the active support of the 
Sunni opposition and, at population level, 
the generous acceptance of refugees was 
designed to ensure that Turkey would be-
come a defining power in the new Syria 
after the war’s end. 
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Not only did Turkey keep the border 
open for refugees, but also for Syrian and 
international fighters. As the Turkish com-
mentator Murat Yetkin stated so aptly on 
15 January 2015, the open border policy 
was also part of Turkey’s strategy to acceler-
ate the fall of Assad. International pressure 
to step up border controls and prevent the 
transfer of jihadist fighters from all over 
the world was countered with references to 
the refugees’ plight from figures including 
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu on 10th 
January 2015 in Berlin, just three days after 
the Paris attacks on the satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo. 
The fact that Turkey was reluctant to 
seek international support, instead shaping 
its refugee policy alone and in embarrass-
ing isolation, does spark suspicion that the 
refugee camps and their surroundings were 
used as places of retreat and regeneration 
for rebels. Thus, in initial years, Turkey 
denied even Turkish NGOs and the UNHCR 
access to the camps, and was not prepared 
to fulfil minimum standards of transparen-
cy customary in the field of international 
refugee cooperation. For a time, the refu-
gees were treated in accordance with decree 
62/2015, which has never been published 
and the contents of which were not even 
disclosed to the members of parliament. In 
2012, Metin Corabatir, at that time Turkey’s 
UNHCR spokesperson, also pushed for the 
relocation of refugee camps close to the 
border, this in order to exclude their mili-
tary use. 
Moreover, the Turkish government has 
used the high number of refugees in order 
to justify and reinforce its call for the im-
position of a no-fly zone in order to weaken 
the Syrian air force and to support the 
rebels, reiterated repeatedly since 2012. 
Prime Minister Davutoğlu made a final 
thrust in this direction as the refugee move-
ments in the Aegean reached their height. 
On 27th September, he proposed the cleans-
ing of a strip of land approximately 80 kilo-
metres in length west of the Euphrates in 
Northern Syria of “Islamic State” troops. He 
suggested that the area should be declared 
a secure zone, in which Turkey could, using 
European funding, create three refugee 
cities, each with the capacity to house 
100,000 individuals. According to Davutoğlu, 
the refugee movements in the Aegean have 
helped Europe to realise Turkey’s major 
contribution to date, and the essential role 
it plays in the management of the refugee 
crisis. In recent years, the Turkish govern-
ment has attempted to compare its strategy 
in the Syrian Civil War with the interests of 
the refugees so frequently that even Turkish 
commentators were on the verge of con-
cluding that it was about to gamble away 
the moral superiority gained by its accept-
ance of the refugees. 
“Sell-out of European values” and 
“kowtowing to Ankara” 
To date, this “baseline situation” in Turkey 
has played almost no part in European dis-
cussions on cooperation with the country 
in the handling of the refugee crisis. Al-
though the financial pressure on Turkey is 
acknowledged and the hospitality of the 
population praised, the signs of a change 
in sentiment have been ignored thus far, 
along with the question of the political cost 
of the refugees’ integration within Turkey’s 
already fiercely competitive labour market. 
There has also been little regard for the cur-
rent legal framework. The fact that Turkey’s 
political instrumentalisation of the refugee 
crisis is not addressed openly is relatively 
easy to comprehend – after all, one does not 
wish to alienate a possible partner from the 
outset. If Turkey continues to use the refu-
gee issue as part of its Syria policy – so far 
without success – the chances of joint action 
with the EU are poor. 
As a result, a consideration of mutual 
interests pursued by Europe and Turkey 
through a cooperation in the refugee crisis 
becomes increasingly important. 
That, instead of this, norm-referenced 
and value-based discussions are primarily 
the order of the day, and that a collabora-
tion with Turkey is currently being re-
jected, can be partially explained as follows. 
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It is important to recall that European-
Turkish relations are viewed almost exclu-
sively within the framework of the relation-
ship of a candidate seeking accession to the 
Union and a European Union imposing 
conditions on this candidacy. This also 
applies to the liberal voices within Turkey. 
The meeting of the EU heads of state and 
government with Turkey took place at a 
time in which Turkey registered a serious 
backslide as far as freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press, rule of law and the 
protection of minorities were concerned. 
As a result, human rights organisations and 
Turkish liberals understandably viewed 
what they perceived as the valorisation of 
the Turkish government via the agreement 
of biannual consultations of the Union 
and Turkey at the highest levels as sheer 
mockery. In their opinion, the same applies 
to the EU’s readiness to accelerate negotia-
tions regarding the country’s accession. 
There was talk of dirty dealing and the sell-
out of European values. The Amnesty Inter-
national representative in Turkey even 
spoke of a stain on the EU’s conscience. 
Meanwhile, in Germany and other EU 
member states, a public critical of Turkey 
sneered at what was deemed “kowtowing” 
by European politics to President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. 
All this illustrates that eyes remain 
firmly closed to the unpleasant realisation 
that the familiar power balance between 
the EU and accession candidate Turkey has 
now turned on its head, for, in the refugee 
crisis, the EU is more reliant on Turkey 
than vice versa. 
In the face of this, Ankara’s desire to 
continue the accession process represents 
an opportunity for the EU, and a response 
to this is by no means a burden. This is 
because only the accession process can 
provide the EU with the opportunity to 
relativise Turkey’s current power status 
towards it in the mid-term, by ensuring 
that Ankara resumes its role as candidate 
and the EU regains influence over Turkish 
policy via the hierarchy intrinsic to the 
accession process. Fortunately for the EU, 
Ankara has recognised that it is dependent 
on good relations with the EU in both the 
medium and long term. 
Criticism of the deal with Ankara which 
concentrates solely on the breach of Euro-
pean values and standards by Turkey mis-
construes the nature of the accession nego-
tiations and their effect on the candidate 
countries. After all, the accession negotia-
tions constitute the EU’s most effective 
means of influencing the domestic and re-
form policies of accession candidates, and it 
was during precisely those years of actual 
deadlock in the negotiations that the largest 
setbacks in the democratic culture of Turkey 
were observed. The accession negotiations 
instrument should certainly not be surren-
dered by those interested in an improve-
ment of the political situation in Turkey. 
We must also remember that the decision 
to open negotiation chapters invariably 
follows political considerations, yet the 
consultations in the individual chapters are 
of a technical and juridical nature and no 
progress can be made in this respect with-
out reform and concrete improvements. 
However, fears that Turkey could bluff its 
way into the EU on the grounds of its sig-
nificance in terms of security policy for 
Europe and without the fulfilment of demo-
cratic and constitutional standards are not 
only out of place for this reason, but also 
as there is no automatism within the acces-
sion process, and each additional step to-
wards rapprochement requires the agree-
ment of all member states. 
Turkey and Europe at a crossroads 
A Euro-critical and even anti-European tone 
prevails in Turkey today – among the popu-
lation and in government circles alike. 
Despite this, Ankara is seeking a fresh start 
with the European Union via the refugee 
crisis. Prime Minister Davutoğlu would like 
17 chapters to be opened within the next 
five years, four to five of which are to be 
tackled in 2016. This is because Turkey is 
facing a political disaster. For years now, it 
has devoted special attention to the Middle 
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East, neglecting the European Union and 
seeking rapprochement with Sunni-Arab 
countries and Russia instead. However, Tur-
key’s vision of becoming a leading power 
in the Middle East has failed to materialise. 
Ankara’s relations with Iran, Iraq, Egypt 
and Israel have reached an all-time low. 
Today, Turkey once more requires trans-
atlantic backing against Russia, which, just 
two years ago, Erdoğan approached to seek 
his country’s inclusion in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. The years of 
plenty are also over as far as the economy 
is concerned. Newly-conquered markets 
have collapsed after just short periods of 
time, and the regression in domestic policy 
has frightened off investors. 
As a result, the European Union, despite 
its present predicament, more than retains 
its ability to take action where Turkey is 
concerned. 
However, as regards a cooperation on the 
refugee issue, Brussels should not under-
estimate both Turkey’s difficulties and the 
resistance within the country to a collabo-
ration with Europe. For a cooperation can 
only bear fruit if not only Europe, but Tur-
key too, benefit directly from the same. As 
a result, European countries should lighten 
Turkey’s load by accepting a substantial 
number of refugees already registered there 
– primarily families with children. To pro-
duce this effect, Europe’s offer must be 
presented as a convincing “package”, which 
contains financial aid and commitments to 
the receiving of refugees in equal measure. 
Those who, like EU Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger, believe that a cooperation can 
be achieved via financial means alone, and 
seek to console Ankara as far as the regulat-
ed admission of refugees from Turkey is 
concerned, have failed to grasp the gravity 
of the situation. 
Because it is by no means a foregone 
conclusion that Turkey will actually fall in 
line with Europe once again. The debate 
surrounding the future of Turkey not only 
divides government and opposition, but is 
also being fought out within the ruling 
party. In this context, signals from Europe 
increase in importance. 
Europe itself should recall that collabo-
rations with Turkey have always been moti-
vated by foreign and security policy – issues 
which are perhaps more valid than ever be-
fore in the light of the state disintegration 
in the Middle East and its ensuing impact. 
The refugee crisis and a new dimension of 
terror are merely the initial results of this 
development. 
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